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cisions are being used to explain later developments quickly reveals not one argument but many. Either these specific arguments are often not clearly spelled out, or the scope of their application remains unexplored.
This essay investigates the range of arguments that lie behind the general label of policy feedback. Part of my purpose is to indicate the sheer range of existing work, which provides compelling evidence that the analysis of policy feedback constitutes a major research frontier in comparative politics. The discussion also seeks to help scholars expand their investigations of policy feedback. Because researchers have not clearly specified the range of ways in which policies can affect politics, they have often failed to identify important paths of influence. I will argue that there are significant feedback processes-particularly those directly affecting mass publics rather than bureaucrats, politicians, or organized groups-that have yet to receive sufficient attention. Indeed, there is reason to expect that the effects on mass publics may turn out to be the most important political consequences of government growth.
The main goal of this article, however, is to encourage improved use of an increasingly popular type of explanation. The broad claim that "policies produce politics" has been important. Now that we know policy choices have political consequences, however, what needs to be determined is precisely how, when, and where particular effects are likely to occur. We need to ask more complex questions about the extent and operation of feedback. Providing empirical support for specific claims is beyond the scope of this essay. However, it is possible to raise some central questions that deserve attention and to outline some plausible and testable hypotheses about the range and impact of various feedback effects that would reward further study. A close investigation of existing research reveals that particular routes of inquiry are more promising than others. It also suggests that some of the most promising lines of research must draw heavily on work in other traditions, especially rational-choice theory, and that many of the most pressing questions will be difficult to answer through the case study approach that has been the favored tool of historical institutionalists.
The following discussion makes no attempt to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the works considered. In several instances, a focus on policy feedback was not the author's central interest. Yet each has made important contributions to an understanding of the political consequences of public policies. I begin by considering arguments about the ways in which policies provide resources and incentives for political actors, before turning to arguments that concentrate on the cognitive consequences of public policies.
WORLD POLITICS POLICIES AS PRODUCERS OF RESOURCES AND INCENTIVES
Analyses that stress the ways in which political systems confer resources on individuals and create incentives for them are the bread and butter of contemporary political science. By virtue of their location within a political system, particular actors may have direct access to significant political assets. These may be material, but an even more important asset may be access to authority-the capacity to issue commands and take other steps with a reasonable expectation that others will accept these actions as legitimate. Political systems also create incentives, which do not directly confer resources but help to define the alternatives available to individual actors. Incentive structures influence the probability of particular outcomes and the payoffs attached to those outcomes. Individuals choose, but the conditions that frame their decisions provide strong inducements to make particular choices.
While often associated with rational-choice theory, it is worth stressing that these arguments are compatible with the central claims of many investigations operating outside that tradition. Often, the difference between rational-choice and ostensibly competing approaches concerns the explicitness of certain assumptions and the preferred methodologies rather than more fundamental disagreements about the major determinants of political action. For most political scientists operating both within and outside rational-choice frameworks, resources and incentives are key.
Given the scope of modern government, it would be hard to deny that public policies provide resources and incentives that may influence political action. Yet how, and how often, are these feedback effects important? Resource/incentive arguments have been used to support claims of significant policy feedback on social groups, government elites, and mass publics. Perhaps the most successful line of research on policy feedback emphasizes the resource/incentive effects of policies on social groups. If interest groups shape policies, policies also shape interest groups. The organizational structure and political goals of groups may change in response to the nature of the programs they confront and hope to sustain or modify.
INTEREST GROUP EFFECTS
The activity of interest groups often seems to follow rather than precede the adoption of public policies. This is a central theme in Theda Skocpol's Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, which represents both a major contribution to our understanding of American social policy before the New Deal and a considerable theoretical achievement. More than any other scholar, Skocpol has been at the center of efforts to use historical institutionalist analysis to understand the dynamics of policy feedback. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers provides her most sustained effort to show how these processes work in a particular historical case. The prominence Skocpol gives to this variable suggests that, even before the arrival of "big government," policy choices could have major political consequences.
Skocpol identifies "changes in social groups and their political goals and capabilities" (p. 58) as one of two major types of policy feedback. In emphasizing the linkage between policies and interest groups, she echoes a common theme. Jack Walker's detailed investigation of interest groups in the United States, for example, noted that "the steady expansion of the federal government figures as one of the major causes of the recent growth of new organizational devices for linking citizens with their government. "4 As in much of the research on policy feedback, however, arguments about the relationship between previous policies and patterns of interest articulation are quite diverse, and analysts have not always been careful to specify precisely what the relationship between the two variables might be. Policies provide both incentives and resources that may facilitate or inhibit the formation or expansion of particular groups. The incentives stem primarily from the major social consequences of specific government actions. Public policies often create "spoils" that provide a strong motivation for beneficiaries to mobilize in favor of programmatic maintenance or expansion. Skocpol cites the case of Civil War pensions: "After initial legislative liberalizations, veterans became self-consciously organized and mobilized to demand ever improved benefits" (p. 59).
Exactly who is induced to mobilize will often depend on the precise nature of policy interventions. In an influential article, Weir and Skocpol suggested that a crucial difference between Swedish and U.S. social policies during the 1930s was that the former helped to cement a farmer/ worker political alliance while the latter did not. The Swedish Social Democrats devised a system of price supports without production controls that was attractive to small farmers. The structure of New Deal agricultural policies, by contrast, activated affluent farmers who had little inclination to establish common cause with urban workers:
Rather than enduringly uniting labor with those farmers who would benefit most from increased domestic consumption and state interventions in agriculture, the New Deal ended up joining together larger, commercially well-established, export-oriented southern cotton producers with better- Among the most distinctive features of the regulatory statutes enacted during the first half of the 1970s was precisely that they were not directed toward specific industries. Rather, they sought to change the behavior of companies in a wide variety of different industries. This made many business executives much more conscious of their common or class interests, which in turn led to both the formation and revival of political organizations that represented firms in many different industries, such as the Business Roundtable, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the National Federation of Independent Business.6
Policy designs can also create niches for political entrepreneurs, who may take advantage of these incentives to help "latent groups" overcome collective action problems. with a niche for activity. The sale of health insurance prior to the enactment of Medicare, and of "Medigap" policies since then, has provided a strong "selective incentive" for individuals to join AARP. These conditions promoted the development of an elderly lobby that is unmatched in other countries. ' Not only do public policies create incentives for interest group activities, they may also provide resources that make that activity easier. The political influence of groups varies dramatically; some are central actors in the development of policy, while others are ineffectual, forced to accept gains and losses determined elsewhere. Public policies can clearly "feed back" into politics in this respect, too. Policies can have an effect on the resources of groups and the ability of groups to bring those resources to bear on decision makers.
Sometimes government policies create interest group resources in a straightforward sense, as when legislation provides funding to favored organizations or provides incentives for individuals to join particular groups (e.g., by banning or harassing alternative organizations). In a compelling essay on the development of the Swedish labor movement, Bo Rothstein has demonstrated that policy designs that gave unions authority over unemployment funds provided a crucial impetus to the development of powerful labor confederations.9 Union administration of these funds gave workers a strong "selective incentive" to become union members. Rothstein's comparative analysis indicates that union density rose rapidly and stabilized at higher levels in countries that adopted this particular design for unemployment insurance.
Policies may also strengthen particular groups by increasing their access to decision makers. The literature on corporatism contains many examples of this kind of process.10 Governments pursuing a complicated social and economic agenda adopted policies that brought important social actors (usually business associations and labor confederations) directly into the decision-making process. Essentially, these governments tried to increase their effectiveness by trading expanded group access to policymakers for group acquiescence to current initiatives. Circumstances where governments can use a variety of instruments to achieve the same policy goals provide another good opportunity to study resource/incentive feedback on social groups. For example, farm incomes can be maintained through government purchases of surplus produce, price supports, or transfer payments to farmers. Although each option would provide income for farmers, the different policies might have quite different consequences for interest group development. Comparative analyses that examine the use of different policy instruments to achieve similar goals can determine if the variation in instruments has political consequences. These investigations could clarify how specific characteristics of policies promote particular patterns of interest group formation and activity. Doing so would provide a stronger basis for moving beyond persuasive case studies to some broader propositions about the impact of policy feedback on interest groups.
POLICIES AND THE RESOURCES AND INCENTIVES FOR GOVERNMENT ELITES
According to Skocpol, the second major type of policy feedback is the transformation of state capacities. "Because of the official efforts made to implement new policies using new or existing administrative arrangements," she writes, "policies transform or expand the capacities of the state. They therefore change the administrative possibilities for official initiatives in the future, and affect later prospects for policy implementation" (p. 58). 
FEEDBACK EFFECTS ON MASS PUBLICS
Resource/incentive arguments have generally explored the impact of policy feedback on organized interests and government elites. However, public policies also provide resources and create incentives for mass publics. Unless these resources and incentives directly induce political action, they are unlikely to attract the attention of political scientists. Perhaps it is not surprising then that the most detailed examination of how the resources generated by public policies affect mass publics is the recent work of a sociologist, G0sta Esping-Andersen. In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen makes a strong plea for greater attention to policy feedback:
The present challenge for comparative research is to study welfare states in their role as independent, causal variables. . . . The welfare state is be- mal. In developing his argument, North draws heavily on economic historians' discussions of the development of technology. I will begin by summarizing this research, will review North's application of the analysis to institutions, and then will suggest how it can be extended to the study of policy feedback.2" Economic historians using the assumptions of neoclassical economics have recently demonstrated that under certain conditions the development of technology will not proceed toward the most economically efficient alternatives. The "QWERTY" typewriter keyboard is a classic example. Although more efficient alternatives to QWERTY quickly emerged, there were strong pressures to develop an industry standard. In this instance, being relatively well established was more important than being best. Alternative keyboard types could not gain a foothold in the industry, and the QWERTY standard was effectively locked in.22 Under what conditions are such outcomes likely? Brian Arthur has identified the following factors:
-Large set-up orfixed costs. If initial costs are a high proportion of total expenses, there are likely to be increasing returns to further investment in a given technology, providing individuals with a strong incentive to identify and stick with a single option.
-Learning effects. Large learning effects, which may lower product costs or improve their use as prevalence increases, provide an additional source of increasing returns.
-Coordination effects. In many cases, the advantages an individual derives from a particular activity depend on the action of others. These effects may encourage coordination with others in adopting a single option.
-Adaptive expectations. If it is important for individuals to "pick the right horse"-because options that fail to win broad acceptance will have drawbacks later on-individual expectations about usage patterns may become self-fulfilling.23
The existence of lock-in effects in the development of technology is now generally accepted, but one can legitimately ask whether this excursion into economic history has any relevance to the current discussion. North argues persuasively that it does. The factors Arthur identifies as contributing to technological lock-in-increasing returns and high fixed costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations- are often characteristic of institutions. Consequently, one could anticipate the same kinds of historical processes, in which initial choice of institutional design had long-term implications for economic and political performance. This argument can easily be applied to public policies as well. North defines institutions broadly as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, . . . the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (p. 3). This definition would seem to encompass public policies as well as what we conventionally recognize as institutions, since policies clearly do establish rules and create constraints that shape behavior. The specific example North uses to illustrate his argument about path dependence is instructive. The Northwest Ordinance was a quasiconstitutional initiative, outlining the basic rules of the game for "the governance and settlement of the vast area of land in the West and ... a framework by which the territories would be integrated into the new nation" (p. 97). In this respect, it resembles a formal institution. However, the Northwest Ordinance was also "a specific legislative enactment"-that is, a public policy.
By choosing such a legalistic, foundational initiative that created such straightforward rules of the game, North obscures the broad application of his argument to policy feedback. Policies may create incentives that encourage the emergence of elaborate social and economic networks, greatly increasing the cost of adopting once-possible alternatives and inhibiting exit from a current policy path. Major policy initiatives have major social consequences. Individuals make important commitments in response to certain types of government action. These commitments, in turn, may vastly increase the disruption caused by new policies, effectively "locking in" previous decisions.
Like more formal institutions, public policies operating in a context of complex social interdependence will often generate increasing returns as well as high fixed costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations. For example, housing and transportation policies in the United States after World War II encouraged massive investments in particular spatial patterns of work, consumption, and residence. Once in place, these patterns sharply constrained the alternatives available to policymakers on issues ranging from energy policy to school desegrega- were literally cast in concrete, but this need not be the case. Policies may encourage individuals to develop particular skills, make certain kinds of investments, purchase certain kinds of goods, or devote time and money to certain kinds of organizations. All these decisions generate sunk costs. That is to say, they create commitments. In many contexts, policies may push individual behavior onto paths that are hard to reverse.
Research on Reagan and Thatcher's social policies provides a good illustration of the wide scope of these policy feedbacks.25 Reagan's inability to restructure public pensions can be partly attributed to lock-in processes. Since 1939, Social Security in the United States has operated on a pay-as-you-go basis: current benefits are paid out of current contributions; each working generation pays for the previous generation's retirement. Once such a system matures, it becomes essentially locked-in. Because the currently retired generation has made irreversible commitments based on the existence of a public system of old-age pensions, moving to a private system (which would necessarily be financed by earnings on invested contributions) creates a "double-payment problem"; current workers would have to finance both their parents' retirement and their own. This made any major privatization initiative in the United States unthinkable. By contrast, because of the constant alternation of Conservative and Labour governments during the 1960s and 1970s, Britain failed to develop a mature earnings-related scheme. With the "doublepayment" problem far less prominent, the Thatcher government did not face the policy lock-in confronted by Reagan, and was able to engineer a major shift in policy toward private provision of retirement income.
In contrast to the other "feedback" examined here, this discussion of lock-in has generally not drawn on the political science literature concerned with public policy determination. Analysts have been slow to build an examination of lock-in processes into their models of political development.26 Instead, groundbreaking work has been done by economic historians and students of industrial organization. One reason for this lack of attention is that feedback effects of this kind have a tendency to depoliticize issues. By accelerating the momentum behind one policy path, they render previously viable alternatives implausible. The result Implicitly or explicitly, policy learning arguments build on work in decision-making and organizational theory that emphasizes the variety of techniques (e.g., satisficing, incrementalism) used to cope with limited cognitive capacities.3"
The depiction of political development as a learning process is sometimes presented in sweeping terms. Heclo, for example, talks of "social learning" and "political learning" and identifies a number of sources of such effects. Prominent among them, however, is the impact of previously adopted public policies, and it is these "policy-learning" effects that There are questions, then, about the circumstances under which "learning effects" on state actors or social groups will be most important. Hall makes progress on this issue in a recent essay, distinguishing three levels of policy change, and arguing that the learning process will not be identical in the three cases.38 First-order change alters the settings of policy instruments while the instruments used and the goals of policy remain constant. Second-order change modifies instruments as well as settings; while third-order change, which marks a clear break with past practice, involves simultaneous shifts in settings, instruments, and goals. Hall argues that in the relatively incremental processes of first-and second-order change, the learning process is likely to be highly technical and relatively insulated, with bureaucrats playing a central role. Thirdorder change, by contrast, involves a wider range of actors and is more "'sociological" and "political" in character.
Hall's effort to disaggregate broad concepts like policy learning and develop more specific propositions about when a particular feedback will operate is precisely what is needed to push the discussion forward. Al in their efforts to assemble meaningful interpretations of the world around them.4' Robert Jervis has stressed that because individuals seek to maintain cognitive consistency, they are strongly inclined "to fit incoming information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there," to "ignore information that does not fit," or to "twist it so that it confirms" beliefs already held.42 Swidler's and Jervis's arguments suggest that proponents of policy-learning arguments face a daunting task. Past policies do help frame discussions of new initiatives, but not in any straightforward fashion. To be convincing, policy learning arguments must offer clearer propositions about the conditions that lead particular actors to view previous initiatives in positive or negative terms. Further, they need to show that the policies have some significant independent impact on actors' political behavior, rather than simply contributing to actors' accounts of their actions.
Finally, there is a pressing need to establish the range of circumstances under which policy-learning arguments are likely to be persuasive. If governments both "power" and "puzzle," when should we expect to see one process or the other predominate? In this respect, policy-learning arguments have also suffered from an emphasis on illustrating processes rather than establishing the frequency of those processes. arguments to examine prospects for successful coalition formation. Support among experts for unemployment insurance was of limited use in the absence of strong backing within state legislatures.
The Hall volume represents a second effort to place policy-learning arguments in a broad comparative framework, since it investigates the dissemination of Keynesian ideas in a number of countries. On my reading, the results are disappointing for those who would stress this dimension of policy feedback. Of the empirical essays, only Lee's puts heavy emphasis on policymakers' experience with prior policies, and his efforts to link specific policies with later political processes are sketchy at best. In Hall's concluding essay, which advances a complex explanation for the reception of Keynesian ideas, policy-learning arguments recede into the background. Hall lists "collective associations with similar policies" as one of several factors affecting the political viability of Keynesian proposals, but his account places more weight on party structures, the interests of potential coalition partners, and the reputations of Keynesianism's exponents. Further, he stresses that political viability is only one part of a complete explanation: Keynesian proposals needed to pass tests of economic and administrative viability as well. In contrast to Hall's singlecase study of British policy-making, this cross-national investigation suggests a limited role for policy-learning effects.
While making some progress on the question of how learning effects may interact with other variables, even these multicase studies could make limited progress on the scope question because they looked at only one type of policy. Determining when learning effects are likely to be prominent will require carefully designed research projects comparing different types of policies and different policy-making environments. While a detailed examination of such a research agenda is not possible here, a few plausible and illustrative hypotheses can be suggested.
First, the degree of insulation of decision makers is likely to be important. Learning processes are more likely to be prominent when a small number of actors are involved.44 Widening the scope of conflict increases the chances for disagreement and hence the decisiveness of political resources.45 Analysts need to think about the characteristics of policies that are conducive to relatively insulated policy-making. A second factor of significance may be policy complexity. The greater the technical proficiency required to understand an issue and possible policy responses, the greater the likelihood that learning effects stemming from social investigation and analysis will be prominent. As I will discuss in more detail below, some government activities involve rather direct connections between policy and outcomes (e.g., the relationship between the legality of abortion and the options available to pregnant women; the relationship between pension benefits and the financial status of the elderly), while in other cases the causal chains are more complex and uncertain (e.g., the relationship between educational policy and economic competitiveness). Where policies are not complex, "puzzling" is likely to give way to "powering." An argument about the role of policy learning may be far more persuasive in accounting for changes in educational policy than it will be in explaining policy covering abortion.
Finally, it is very likely that policy learning plays a different role at different stages of the policy-making process. Learning effects will be most apparent in the specification of alternatives, since this is when detailed knowledge is most crucial.46 The heavy weight Heclo gives to learning effects and bureaucratic influence stems partly from his desire to account for the identification and development of specific policy alternatives rather than more general policy orientations.47 Agenda-setting and the final choice of policies are likely to be the result of other kinds of influences. If so, this suggests an important limit to the scope of policylearning arguments.
The work of Hall, Amenta, and their colleagues indicates a growing interest in fleshing out the insights of a policy-learning approach; but they only begin the process of producing answers to the questions of when, where and how policy-learning effects might be important. To determine the scope of learning arguments, scholars need to disaggregate policy-making along two dimensions. Disaggregating policy-making temporally (along the standard lines of agenda setting, alternative specification, policy choice, and implementation) will permit an evaluation of policy learning's role at different stages of the political process. Yet beyond rather vague formulations, such as the suggestions that some policies are "visible" and others are not or that some policies generate "focusing events" and others do not, there was until recently little systematic discussion of the characteristics of initiatives that produce particular "cues" for social actors. However, political scientists are now making significant progress on several fronts. R. Kent Weaver's work on blame avoidance indicated that policymakers will take steps, including the redesign of policies, to modify public awareness of their actions, depending on whether or not they expect those actions to be popular. According to Arnold, two conditions must hold for public policies to generate a response from mass publics. The first condition is visibility: voters must experience some discernible outcome that leads them to inquire about the cause of this outcome. The second condition is traceability: to respond by rewarding or punishing politicians, the electorate must be able to link that outcome to some governmental action. The critical point is that both visibility and traceability can vary independently of a policy's actual impact and that this variation may be a product of policy design. Specific features determine a policy's informational content, influencing both these determinants of the electorate's reaction. Policies that distribute benefits widely and intermittently are less likely to be visible than policies that distribute benefits to a concentrated group and in a single package. Whether those affected are part of a network (e.g., geographical or occupational) allowing communication with others affected (what Arnold has called proximity) is another important factor. Homeowners living near a toxic dump and dairy farmers sharing a common profession are each likely to be part of networks that facilitate communication and therefore improve the chances that they will become aware of outcomes that affect them; recipients of disability payments who have their benefits cut are not.
The traceability of policies varies as well. Traceability really involves two distinct tests: can visible outcomes be linked to government policy and can those policies be linked to someone who can be given credit or blame? A crucial factor in linking outcomes to policy, as Arnold notes, is the "length of the causal chain." The more stages and uncertainties that lie between a policy's enactment and a perceived outcome, the less likely it is that those affected will respond politically. Producers, who see a direct link between tariff levels and their own profitability, are much more likely to be activated than consumers, for whom the causal chain is longer. Consumers may not like the prices they pay for goods, but they are unlikely to attribute those prices to government trade policies. In general, the more difficult it is to sort out causal arguments-the more complex the policy-the less likely it is that voters will trace even major problems to specific government decisions.
Policymakers have a significant degree of control over this aspect of traceability. They may choose interventions that create causal chains of varying lengths. Ideally, they would like to design programs for which the benefits involve short causal chains and the costs involve long ones. Time lags, for example, add greatly to the length and complexity of causal chains, so policymakers favor policy designs that front-load benefits and back-load costs.
The second aspect of traceability, linking government action to specific decision makers, may also depend on policy design.55 Policies can either illuminate or obscure the role of decision makers. As Weaver has argued, indexation mechanisms, which put particular policies on "automatic," have proven attractive precisely because they reduce the traceability of outcomes to particular decision makers.56 To take another recent example, the intricate legislative history surrounding the evolution of U.S. policy regulating savings and loan institutions made it practically impossible for even the most incensed taxpayer to know which politicians to hold accountable for the massive costs imposed on the Treasury.
There is significant evidence that the information content of policies is important for mass publics and that these feedback effects deserve careful attention. Certainly the ability to raise or lower the profile of their actions for different constituencies would seem to give politicians an important political resource. Unfortunately, the methodological problems associated with this kind of analysis are substantial. It is often difficult enough to measure the most concrete consequences of policies, let alone things as intangible as traceability and visibility. While Arnold's concept of "causal chains" offers a promising beginning, he acknowledges that the efforts of actors to create these chains are a "subjective process" likely to be highly complex and culturally contingent.57 However, one could certainly begin, as scholars have with tax policy, with some fairly simple measures of visible and traceable policy designs and could seek to identify the political consequences of each.
The potential payoff seems well worth the effort. Recall the discussion of resource/incentive feedback on government elites, where I argued that it has been very difficult to establish strong claims about the impact of policy feedback. By contrast, the arguments of Wilensky and others about tax visibility, if correct, would significantly contribute to our understanding of the fiscal resources of states, which Skocpol has claimed tells us "more than could any other single factor about [the state's] existing (and immediately potential) capacities to create or strengthen state organizations, to employ personnel, to coopt political support, to subsidize economic enterprises, and to fund social programs. "58 That potential underscores the basic point of this discussion of interpretive arguments about policy feedback. Policies indeed allocate large quantities of resources and create powerful incentives, but some of their most important effects may be cognitive. The massive scope of public policies assures that they play a significant role in our efforts to understand and act in an enormously complex political world.
AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH ON POLICY FEEDBACK
The scholarship reviewed in this essay shares a common feature: the claim that policies themselves must be seen as politically consequential structures. The rise of active government leaves little room for doubt about this general proposition. Nonetheless, the fact that policy feedback arguments are now widely applied in divergent national contexts and across a variety of issue-areas drives home the growing importance of this concept to the study of comparative politics.59 To take only a few of the examples discussed in this essay, policy feedback arguments have been used to help account for Britain's triumph over France in the eighteenth century, the development of Sweden's powerful labor movement, and the failure of New Deal reformers to cement a farmer/worker alliance. In a wide range of circumstances and in numerous ways, policies restructure politics. This lengthy discussion also reveals the diversity of arguments that lies behind a general claim. Based on the preceding discussion, Figure 1 offers a summary of the dimensions of policy feedback. The summary utilizes a distinction between two main feedback mechanisms (resource/ incentive effects and interpretive effects) and among three sets of actors affected by these mechanisms (government elites, social groups, and mass publics). The framework suggests six separate pathways of influence 58 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies and Analysis in Current Research," in Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol (fn. 5), 17. 59 For those uninterested in the roots of current politics, policy feedback arguments may nonetheless be useful. The fact that such political consequences of policy design are likely to be discernible to policymakers raises an additional issue that deserves attention: the extent to which decision makers self-consciously design policies to produce particular feedback effects. Especially as government activity becomes widespread, politicians are likely to become aware that policy choices have political consequences. This suggests that feedback effects should not only be incorporated into political analysis because previous policies influence current politics. Current political struggles may well reflect concern over the future political consequences of contemporary policy choices. Cognizance of the possible range of such consequences may give analysts important insights into the strategic choices facing contemporary political actors.
running from policies to politics, although several pathways (e.g., the impact of resource/incentive mechanisms on social groups) may involve multiple sources of influence.
This framework indicates where scholars might expect to find significant causal connections between public policies and political developments. It is not, however, an effort to follow the well-known attempts of analysts like Lowi and Wilson to develop an extremely parsimonious theory linking specific policy "types" to particular political outcomes.60 The current discussion suggests two reasons why such efforts are unlikely to provide a sound basis for theory building. First, as Figure 1 indicates, individual policies may have a number of politically relevant characteristics, and these characteristics may have a multiplicity of consequences. Second, as a number of studies discussed in this essay suggest, policy feedback rarely operates in isolation from features of the broader political environment (e.g., institutional structures, the dynamics of party systems).6" The impact of policies is likely to occur in interaction with other variables. For both these reasons, it seems doubtful that we can expect to develop sweeping theories that link a few policy "types" to clearly defined political outcomes. Instead, a more promising strategy is to develop middle-range theories that acknowledge both the complexity of feedback and its context-specific qualities.
This discussion carries some specific implications for research agendas. A greater recognition of the wide scope of possible feedback-and, in particular, of how policy feedback affects mass publics-can strengthen work on the political consequences of public policies. Too often, analysts interested in feedback effects have looked at only one or two possible pathways of influence. Although many of the processes sketched out here will not be important in particular cases, each should be explored. Attention to the impact of policies on individual actors outside the circuit of bureaucrats, politicians, and interest groups is especially urgent. Policies have a major influence on mass publics, generating 60 ter require a significant reevaluation of the psychological foundations of individual choice, leading to a thicket of intriguing but perhaps intractable questions. By contrast, the former approach calls only for the incorporation of information into the universe of relevant political resources. It is no accident that both the arguments I have advanced about policy feedback on mass publics (the production of lock-in effects and the provision of information) draw heavily on work in rational-choice theory. While historical institutionalists have studied state structures and social groups, the use of microeconomic theory leads naturally to a focus on individual behavior. Economists have developed powerful models for exploring how different institutional frameworks and resource distributions influence both individual choices and the ways in which individual choices lead to particular aggregate outcomes. Wedded to historical institutionalist arguments about the prominence of public policies and the importance of tracing historical processes, these insights from rationalchoice theory offer promising openings for the study of policy feedback on mass publics.
Finally, the diversity of the arguments identified here and the uncertainty regarding the scope of many of them also suggests the need for a more fundamental reexamination of research agendas. While the utility of policy feedback arguments seems clear, there are a great many unanswered questions about the circumstances under which preexisting policies are likely to influence political processes, and about the particular types of influence that are most important. Resolving these issues will require a reformulation of questions. Rather than asking "Do policies produce politics?" we need to ask more precise questions about how policies matter and under what conditions. Getting at the answers will often require careful attention to research design. This conclusion highlights both the merits and limitations of recent work in historical institutionalism. By now, the merits should be clear. The emergence of arguments about policy feedback has stemmed largely from research that takes structural constraints imposed by government seriously, that utilizes detailed case studies, and that emphasizes that history matters-that political processes should be analyzed over time. As Skocpol puts it:
Too often social scientists . .. forget that policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes. Analysts typically look only for synchronic determinants of policies-for example, in current social interests or in existing political alliances. In addition, however, we must examine patterns unfolding over time.. . . We must make social policies the starting points as well as the end points of analysis. (p. 58)
WORLD POLITICS
Because historical institutional analysis encourages intensive scrutiny of specific historical paths, it has been ideally suited to identify the existence of policy feedback mechanisms. The same approach, however, has had greater difficulty in moving to the next phase: establishing the scope of particular mechanisms, and the specific characteristics of policies and the broader context that are likely to make particular mechanisms relevant.
Much can probably be done within a historical institutionalist framework to cope with these problems. More specific questions need to be asked and hypotheses need to be carefully stated. Insights from rational choice theory need to be incorporated. But it is difficult to see how many of these more specific questions can be answered through the use of single-case studies. Investigating many of the most pressing questions may require a reorientation toward the investigation of large samples that would allow the application of statistical techniques.
Political scientists study what they do because they believe that politics matters-that government decisions have major social consequences. It is surely ironic that among the least understood of these consequences are the feedback effects on political life. Much like the formal institutions that have recently received extensive scholarly attention, major policies frame the choices of political actors both by creating resources and incentives and by influencing the efforts of individuals to interpret the social world. Incorporating this insight more systematically into research will greatly enrich our understanding of politics.
